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THE CUTLER LECTURES 
Established at the College oj William and Mary 
in Virginia by James Goold Cutler 
oj Rochester, N. Y . 
. The late James Goold Cutler of Rochester, 
New York, in making his generous gift to the 
endowment of the Marshall-Wythe School of 
Government and Citizenship in the College of 
William and Mary provided, among other things, 
that one lecture should be given at the College in 
each calendar year by some person "who is an 
outstanding authority on the Constitution of the 
United States." Mr. Cutler wisely sa.id that it 
appeared to him that the most useful contribu-
tion he could make to promote t,he making of de-
mocracy safe for the world (to invert President 
Wilson's aphorism) was to promo.te serious con-
s.ideration by as many people as possible of cer-
tain points fundamental and therefore vital to 
the permanency of constitutional government in 
the United States. Mr. Cutler declared as a 
basic proposition that our political system breaks 
down, when and where it failsJ because of the 
lack of sound education of the people for whom 
and by whom it was intended to be carried on. 
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently suc-
cessful business men who took tirrie from his busy 
life to study constitutional government. As a 
result of his study, he recognized with unusual 
clearness the magnitude of our debt to the 
makers, in terpreters and defenders of the Con-
stitution of the United States. 
He was deeply interested in the College of 
William and Mary because he W<l:S a student of 
history and knew what great contributions were 
made to the cause of constitutional government 
by men who taught and studied here-Wythe 
and Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, Monroe 
and Tyler, and a host of others who made this 
country great. He, therefore, thought it pecu-
liarly fitting to endow a chair of government 
here and to provide for a popular "lecture each 
year by some outstanding authority on the 
Constitution of the United States." 
The fourth lecturer in the course was Senator 
Guy Despard Goff, former member of the U. S. 
Senate from West Virginia. 
THE APPOINTING AND REMOVAL 
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
OFTHE UNITED STATES 
GUY DESPARD GOFF 
Member U. S. Senate from West Virginia 
March 4th, 192s-March 3rd, 1931 
I t is a privilege as rare as it is inspiring to 
discuss in these halls of learning the Constitution 
of the United States. It was amid these sur-
roundings that many of the master minds 
responsible for the adoption of this immortal 
instrument were trained in the ways of human 
discipline and guided toward mental and moral 
progress. They had fai th in God and, wi th the 
ability to perceive, they besought counsel and 
advice in every step forward. They realized 
that loyalty, service and enterprise must be 
infused into all human activities if liberty, 
order, prosperity and happiness were to be 
eternal. Governments "of the people, for the 
people, and by the people" are not created; 
they are the creatures of Constitutions, and 
they grow out of the past. Constitutions 
"whose just powers are derived from the con- , 
sent of the governed" are not struck off in a 
single convention; they are the acts of the 
people, and they are the slow deliberate work of 
the ages. They are the means by which "a 
sovereign nation of many sovereign states" ex-
presses itself and is exercised. The fabric of 
human institutions is a texture that can be 
woven only in the loom of time. Thought is 
the most potent and active force in all ~he 
world. As Carlisle has so graphically phrased 
it: "Man carries under his hat a private 
theatre wherein a greater drama is acted than 
is ever performed on the mimic stage, beginning 
and ending in eterni ty." In short, all the 
great accomplishments in mortal endeavor are 
simply the offsprings of great and divine ideas. 
They are the intellectual vision of those who 
can see, with accuracy and safety, beyond the 
outposts of experience. It has been truly said 
that: 
While the defense of the Constitution in 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts was able, and 
in New York most brilliant, that the attack 
upon it in the Virginia convention was nowhere 
equaled in argumen t or discussion, or approached 
in power, scholarship, learning, and impressive 
dignity. That the Virginia contest, with its 
gifted and accomplished statesmen, was the 
only real debate over the whole Constitution. 
I t far surpassed in reasoning, argumen t, and 
oratory the discussion in the F~deral convention 
itself. 
[ 6 1 
Yes, from the tongue of Henry, the pen of 
Jefferson, the sword of Washington, and the 
brain of Marshall, whose natal day we now 
observe with pride and reverence, has come 
constitutional liberty, the palladium of all the 
civil, political, and religious rights of Mankind. 
Yes, these Fathers, and they will live forever, 
above all fame, tell us to love, respect, obey, 
support and defend this charter against all 
attacks. They were great because they could 
serve and they have never been excelled in 
learning, ability or patriotic power. 
I borrow from that most able address by 
Judge Alton B. Parker, delivered here January 
14, 1922, the following expressive reflections and 
most accurate meditations: 
Virginia was in that day the greatest of the 
states. She had one-fifth of the population of 
all the States and at least one-fifth of the wealth. 
Moreover, only 18 years before her House of 
Burgesses had passed an act prohibiting slavery, 
which failed to become a law only because of 
King George's direction to the colonial governor 
to withhold his signature from the enactment, 
which was obeyed. The letter of protest to 
the King from the House of Burgesses was a 
brilliant paper, which at the same time bore a 
sad prophecy of that which later happened. I 
quote a single sentence from .it: "We are sen-
sible that some of Your Majesty's subjects in 
[ 7 1 
Great Britain may reap emoluments from this 
sort of traffic; but when we consider that it 
greatly retards the settlement of the colonies 
with more useful inhabitants, and may in time 
have the most destructive influence, we presume 
to hope that the interest of a few will be dis-
regarded when placed in competition with the 
security and happiness of such numbers of 
Your Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects." 
That letter in its entirety should be known 
to all men that they may realize that slavery in 
the great State of Virginia did not meet with 
the approval of her patriotic people when, with 
magnificent hope, they conceived and consented 
to those immortal principles which preserve and 
sustain our liberties, but was due to the King 
and the profiteers of that day, who were not 
at all different from the profiteers at any s)lbse-
quent period. 
Thomas Jefferson, as it has been proudly 
observed, wrote the Declaration of Independ-
ence, and when first presented it contained a 
stinging indictment of the King for enforcing 
slavery upon this country. The convention did 
not accept this indictment and it was the only . 
change of any moment made in that famous 
document. Jefferspn later became the governor 
of Virginia, minister to France, Vice-President 
of the United States, and President for two 
[ 8 1 
terms. George Washington, another of Vir-
ginia's sons, had been commander-in-chief of 
our armies. His great ability, his matchless 
skill and valor, demanded- yes, made necessary 
-his selection as chairman of the Philadelphia 
convention. He was not a member of the 
Virginia convention chosen to pass upon the 
Constitution, for it was his act, in common 
with his associates, which was considered by 
that assembly. But his striking influence was 
there, for he had not hesitated to make it known 
how vital it was that the new national govern-
ment should be ratified as "a p"erfect union" by 
the several states. The people trusted him, 
because they believed he always understood 
them. They knew he stood "for those prin-
ciples of freedom, equality, justice and humanity 
for which American patriots sacrificed their 
lives for their country." In the meeting at 
Philadelphia, with the heart to conceive, and 
the understanding to direct and execute-he 
was the Soul of America. And at a crucial 
crisis in the proceedings, he arose, and in tones 
of suppressed emotion, reflecting the courage, 
the hope and the obedience of Virginia, said: 
It is too probable that no plan we propose will 
be adopted; perhaps another dreadful conflict 
is to be sustained. If to please the people we 
offer what w<:! ourselves disapprove, how can 
[ 9 1 
we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a 
standard to which the wise and the honest can 
repair. The event is in the hands of God. 
And so it was, because out of that conference, 
the attempt and the combined wisdom of the 
many there came "a democracy in a republic," 
"one and inseparable," with centuries of Anglo-
Saxon law and liberty behind it, the largest and 
the best scheme of popular free government 
that the world has yet seen tried-the Consti-
tution of the United States-the Supreme law 
of the land. 
The Constitution of the United States in the 
words of Judge Story: "Was not intended to 
provide merely for the exigencies of a few 
years, but was to endure through a long lapse 
of ages, the wan ts of which were locked in the 
inscrutable purposes of Providence." The in-
strument in its broad general scope did in fact 
reflect the wisdom, a moderation and a patience 
that was as providential as it has proved bene-
ficial to the advancemen t of mankind. I t did, 
with the consent of the people, divide this 
government into three separate and distinct 
departments: The legislative, the executive, 
and the judicial. The object sought was security 
through the equipoise of restraining checks and 
mutual balances. And then of necessity, it 
vested absolute and unrestricted power in each 
[ 10 1 
that there might be in such a division an Im-
pregnable safeguard for life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness for ourselves and our 
posterity. It wisely provided that each depart-
ment should be independent of the decrees and 
the edicts of the other, and that each should be 
given a free and untrammeled hand in their 
respective fields, if they were, with obedience 
and respect for authority, to perform the duties 
and discharg~ the obligations committed to 
them by the pepple. I t in tended by such 
divisions to strengthen our institutions and 
stimulate our patriotism. Fortunately for the 
Constitution and the people, the Supreme Court 
of the United States, discussing this subject 
through the great John Marshall, said: 
The powers of the legislature are defined and 
limited, and that these limits may not be mis-
taken or forgotten, the Constit,ution is written. 
To what purpose are powers limited, and to 
what purpose is that limitation committed to 
writing if these limits may at any time be passed 
by those intended to be restrained. The dis-
tinction between a government with limited 
and unlimited powers is abolished if these limits 
do not confine the persons on whom they are 
imposed. I~ is a proposition too plain to be 
contested that the Constitution controls any 
legislative act repugnant to it, or that the 
legislature may alter the Constitution by any 
ordinary act. 
[ 11 1 
Obviously, such reasoning is conclusive in its 
finality. If the Constitution is not superior to 
an Act of Congress, it becomes a mere scrap 
of paper-an instrument "more honored in the 
breach than in its observance." 
Actual sovereign ty resides in the people as the 
source of all poE tical power; and they can alter or 
change completely at any time the government 
to which they have entrusted only certain 
express and necessarily implied powers. But 
such powers as are given to the government as 
a fiduciary body are named in the Constitution, 
and such powers as are not there delegated 
either expressly or by implication are reserved 
to the people, and can be exercised by them 
only or upon further . grant from them. The 
appointing and the removal power under the 
Constitution will now be considered legislatively 
as the Congress has construed it; executively as 
the Presidents have maintained it; and judicially 
as the courts have interpreted and enforced it. 
It is well always to bear in mind that the 
Federal government has no inherent powers, 
but only those derived from the Constitution 
as expressly delegated or granted by necessary 
implication. And that all powers not thus 
granted are reserved to the States or to the 
people. 
In Section 2, clause 2, of Art. 2 of the Consti-
[ 12 1 
tution, the President of the United States as 
the sole vestee of any and all executive power 
was authorized to nominate and, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint 
ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, judges 
of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of 
the United States whose appointments were not 
expressly provided for; and the President was 
further empowered to commission all such 
officers of the United States. The President's 
powers are in no sense statutory. They are 
constitutional, such as they ar~, as will clearly 
appear in the discussion to follow: In the 
grant of legislative power, the Constitution in 
Art. I, Sec. I, provides: "All legislative power 
herein gran ted shall be ves ted in a Congress of 
the United States which shall consist of a 
Senate and a House of Representatives"; and 
nowhere is there a suggestion, express or implied, 
in any of the powers so granted, of a power to 
remove. In the grant of Executive power, it 
should be recalled that it is to the President, and 
not to an Executive department. It is provided 
in Art. II, Sec. I, "That the Executive power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America." And in Art. II, Section 3, it is also 
provided: That the President "shall take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall 
commission all the officers of the United States." 
[ 13 1 
At the first session of the first Congress, in 
1789, the question directly arose whether the 
appointing power should include the removing 
power, or whether such power should be in the 
executive by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. Mr. Madison and his supporters 
contended most reasonably and logically, that 
the power of removal should be in the Presiden t 
alone, and that since he was expressly respon-
sible under the Constitution for the faithful 
execution of the laws, he should not be inter-
fered with or embarrassed by any other branch 
of the government. It was then said, to quote 
the language used, 
Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the 
President and you abolish at once that great 
principle of unity and responsibility in the 
executive department which was intended for 
the security of liberty and the public good. If 
the Presiden t should possess alone the power of 
removal from office, those who are employed in 
the execution of the law will be in their proper 
situation and the chain of dependence be pre-
served; the lowest officers, the middle grade, 
and the highest will depend, as they ought, on 
the Presiden t, and the Presiden t on the com-
munity. 
It is sufficient to say that at the very beginning 
of our government it was clearly and distinct-
ivelyestablished: 
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1st-That the . appointing power includes the 
removmg power. 
2nd-That both of these powers belong to the 
President, the Senate having simply 
a negative on appointments. 
Jrd-And that where the tenure of office has 
not been provided for by the Con~ti­
tution, the office is held at the pleasure 
of the appointing power. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
whenever called upon to decide this question, 
has repeatedly approved these conclusions; and 
many of our Presidents in their various con-
tentions with the legislative branch have insist-
ently upheld and maintained this view. It has 
been unequivocally shown that the people in 
making these respective delegations, intended to 
intrust their interests and general welfare to 
these different agencies and that they fully 
realized and appreciated that to make each 
independent of the other and strictly responsible 
for the execution of each and every act fairly 
within the scope and aim of their respective 
fields was the only way the rights, the liberty 
and the freedom of the people could be secured 
and protected. That the executive and the 
legislative departments have not always been 
free from contention and strife in their interpre-
tations of where the power of removal resides is 
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clearly reflected in an examination of their 
respective differences and decisions. 
In 1833 President Jackson directed his Sec-
retary of the Treasury, William J. Duane, to 
deposit all government funds in specified State 
banks instead of the Bank of the United States. 
Duane evaded such instructions, whereupon 
President Jackson dismissed him. A heated 
controversy arose in Congress relative to presi-
dential removals, and in the Senate a resolution 
was passed censuring the Presiden t for removing 
the deposits from the United States Bank, and 
declaring he had exceeded his constitutional 
authority. 
In 1835 John C. Calhoun, who was opposed 
to giving the President the power of appoint-
ment and removal of public officers, introduced 
a bill to reduce the Executive patronage. A 
very impressive debate ensued between Mr. 
Webster and Charles Francis Adams, resulting 
in favor of Mr. Adams, who insisted that the 
power of removal belonged to the Presiden t be-
cause it is inseparably connected with the power 
of appointment. 
On August 12, 1867, President Johnson sus-
pended Mr. Stanton, his Secretary of War, and 
immediately appointed General Grant to suc-
ceed him. This action so embittered the Senate 
that it led directly to impeachment proceedings 
[ 16 1 
against him. In the course of the trial, the 
removal power was thoroughly reviewed. On 
May 26, 1868, the vote on the impeachment 
was taken and resulted in Johnson's acquittal 
by a vote of guilty 35, not guilty 19-only one 
vote short of conviction. 
President Grant in his first message strenu-
ously opposed the Congress having anything 
to do with the power of removal. He said: 
"It could not have been the intention of the 
framers of the Constitution when providing 
that appointments made by the President should 
receive the consent of the Senate, that the latter 
should have the power to retain in office persons 
placed there against the will of the President. 
The law is inconsistent with a faithful and 
efficient administration of the government. What 
faith can an executive put in officials forced 
upon him, and those, too, whom he has sus-
pended for reason?" 
In the winter of 1885-86, an acrimonious 
con troversy arose between Presiden t Cleveland 
and the Senate. Upon his accession to the 
Presidency, Mr. Cleveland was besieged by such 
an army of office seekers that 643 office-holders 
under the preceding administration were removed 
and a like number appointed. These recess 
appointments were sent to the Senate within 
30 days after its opening in December, 1885'-
[ 17 1 
One of these recess nominations was the 
district attorneyship for the southern district 
of Alabama. President Cleveland removed the 
incumbent and appointed his successor July 
17, 18~SI' The Judiciary Committee, Decem-
ber 26, 1885, requested the transmission of all 
papers and information in the possession of the 
Attorney General, regarding the nomination 
and "the suspension and proposed removal from 
office" of the former incumbent. The Attorney 
General partially complied but refused to trans-
mit any papers relative to the removal of the 
prior incumbent, stating that he was directed 
by the President to say "that it was not con-
sidered that the public interest will be promoted 
by a compliance." The Judiciary Committee 
then asserted that the Senate possessed such 
a right and recommended a resolution wherein 
the Attorney General was censured and it 
further declared it to be the du ty of the Senate 
"to refuse its advi·ce and consent to proposed 
removals of officers" when papers relating to 
them "are withheld by the Executive or any 
head of a department." This issue was met 
by the President in his defiance of the Senate. 
He took the stand that all presidential removals 
were unencumbered by any restriction of the 
Senate, and that all papers in connection with 
Executive appointments and removals were the 
[ 18 1 
property of the Executive and not subject to 
inspection by the Senate. 
The Senate showed its hostility toward Presi-
dent Cleveland in its prolonged delay in con-
firming Mr. Lamar as Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court and also Melville W. Fuller as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as 
several other important appointments. 
Presiden t Wilson, on June 4, 1920, vetoed 
the budget and accounting bill. He disapproved 
of section 303 which provided, in part, that the 
Comptroller General and the Assistant Comp-
troller General "may be removed at any time 
by concurrent resolution of Congress." The 
Presiden t based his disapproval on the grounds, 
first, that the power of appointment of officers 
of the United States carried with it as an 
incident the power to remove, and that Congress 
was without any constitutional power what-
soever to limit the appointing power and its 
inciden tal power of removal derived from the 
Constitution; and, second, that Congress has 
no constitutional power to remove an officer 
of the United States from office by a concurrent 
resolution. When the bill finally became law 
it provided that the Comptroller General was to 
be removable only by joint resolution of Con-
gress. Just before his retirement, President 
Wilson experienced great difficulty in securing 
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the consent of the Senate to his nominations, 
numbering more than I 0,000. 
Presiden t Harding, likewise, encoun tered the 
ire of the Senate by removing 28 officials of the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, including 
the director of the Bureau. The Senate, how-
ever, took no action, except to bring pressure 
upon the President for the reihstatement of 
certain of these officials. 
President Coolidge, in one of his messages to 
Congress, in response to a resolution of the 
Senate that it was the sense of that body that 
the President should immediately request the 
resignation of the then Secretary of the Navy, 
replied: 
No official recognition can be given to the 
Senate resolution relative to their opinion con-
cerning members of the Cabinet or other officers 
under Executive control. * * * The dismissal 
of an officer of the Government, such as involved 
in this case, other than by impeachment, is 
exclusively an Executive function. I regard 
this as a vital principle of our Government. 
At the last session of the 7Ist Congress, there 
was under consideration a question involving 
the application of this great and far-reaching 
constitutional principle. The President of the 
United States sought, as he was required to do 
under Article 2, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of 
[ 20 1 
the United States,. the advice and consent of 
the Senate in the appointment of five members 
to what is known as the Federal Power Com-
mISSIon. Such nominations were sent to the 
Senate and after a thorough and exhaustive 
consideration the men so nominated were on 
the 19th and 20th of December, 1930, confirmed 
by the Senate in open Executive Session and 
the President, being duly notified of such action 
proceeded on Monday, December 22nd, to 
issue commissions to such nominees, three of 
whom on the same day forthwith duly qualified 
as such appointees by taking the oath of office, 
after first consulting with the Secretary of 
State as to whether it was permissible and 
proper for them so to do. The Power Com-
mission so denominated was appointed. under 
the Act of June 23rd, 1930. It was provided 
in section 3 of that law that the existing old 
Federal Power Commission should continue ' to 
function until the d.ate of the reorganization of 
the new commission and that when three of 
such commissioners should qualify under the 
law that the new Commission should be deemed 
reorganized. After three of the commissioners 
had qualified as stated on the 22nd of Decem-
ber, 1930, the Chairman of such Commission 
was instructed to issue a notice to all the Civil 
Service employees of the old Commission that 
[ 21 1 
their services automatically terminated with 
the going out of existence on the 22nd of Decem-
ber, 1930, of the old Commission under which 
they had been employed. Such a notice was 
duly given and it is important to note that this 
interpretation of the legal effect of such reorgan-
ization was set forth in the report the Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce filed April II, 
1930, in which the Chairman formally stated, in 
reporting the Bill as an emergency matter, that 
it was the sense of the Committee that a com-
petent and full time staff should be organized 
and that it should be permanently under the 
control of the new Commission to the end that 
certain disabilities should be eliminated under 
which the old Commission, consisting of the 
Secreta~ies. of War, the Interior, and the Depart-
men t of Agriculture, had been forced to assume 
and carry. The old existing staff had disagreed 
on matters of policy and in advancing separate 
and dissenting views had impaired their official 
efficiency. The entire Commission of five, having 
duly qualified, on the second of January, 193 1, 
however, resolved that each and every employee 
of the old Commission should without exception 
be invited to file their applications for reappoint-
ment and that all such old employees as were 
not reappointed should be given, if lawful, a 
reasonable leave of absence with pay. This 
[ 22 J 
action on the part of the Commission did not 
meet with the approval of certain members of 
the Senate, and a motion to reconsider their 
confirmations was made and the President was 
requested to return such nominations to the 
Senate that it might reconsider its consent and 
approval heretofore duly given. These steps 
were taken under a rule of the Senate known as 
Senate Rule 38. Paragraph 3 of said rule 
provides that when a nomination is confirmed, 
any Senator voting in the majority may move 
for a reconsideration on the same day on which 
the vote was taken or on either of the next two 
days of actual executive session of the Senate; 
and that if a notification of the confirmation 
has been sen t to the Presiden t before the ex-
piration of the time within which such a motion 
to reconsider may be made, such motion to 
reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion 
to request the President to return such notifica-
tion to the Senate. 
The reason underlying the request that the 
President return such notification to the Senate 
is that if the Senate does not have such ' docu-
ments before it as a record, it is without juris-
diction to proceed. This was determined by 
the Senate in 1830 in the Hill case. In para-
graph 4 of rule 38, it is expressly stated as 
follows: 
[ 23 J 
Nominations confirmed or rejected by the 
Senate shall not be returned by the Secretary to 
the President until the expiration of the time 
limited for making a motion to reconsider the 
same or while a motion to reconsider is pending, 
unless otherwise ordered by the Senate. 
It is important to note, as the record of the 
Senate discloses~ that when these five nominees 
were confirmed on and prior to December 20, 
1930, the Vice-Presiden t and the Presiden t pro 
tempore of the Senate announced in each in-
stance: "The nomination is confirmed and 
the President will be notified." The Secretary 
of the Senate, as the record discloses~ duly 
notified the President and the Commissions 
were issued on Monday, December 22nd, 1930, 
and three of the duly confirmed nominees, as 
stated, qualified by taking the oath of office 
under their respective commissions. It is proper 
to state that the Congress, at th~ time, ad-
journed for the holidays and did not reconvene 
until the fifth day of January, 1931. And on 
the ~fth day of January, 1931, a motion to 
reconsider was duly made, which was more 
than two weeks from and after the 22nd of 
December, 1930, when three of the commission-
ers had duly qualified. The President refused 
to return the notifications of the nominations, 
stating among other things the following: 
[ 24 1 
I am advised that these appointments were 
constitutionally made, with the consent of the 
Senate, formally communicated to me, and that 
the return of the documen ts by me and recon-
sideration by the Senate would be ineffective 
to disturb the appointees in their offices. I 
cannot admit the power in the Senate to en-
croach upon the Executive functions by removal 
of a duly appointed executive officer under the 
guise of reconsideration of his nomination. I 
regret that I must refuse to accede to the 
requests. 
In the controversy, thus precipitated, it was 
uniformly insisted by such Senators as endorsed 
the motion that the reorganization of the new 
Commission did not automatically eliminate 
certain staff members of the old Commission; 
and it was just as insistently answered that the 
language in section 3 of the Act had the effect 
of completely disorganizing the old Commission 
upon such date as three of the newly appointed 
commissioners duly qualified. It was further 
expressly provided that no regulations, actions, 
investigations or other proceedings taken by 
the old Commission should be affected by the 
reorganization here provided. That is, the 
reorganization should not be considered as in 
any way affecting or disturbing any existing 
rules, procedure, process, research or any con-
summated right giving rise to a present enjoy-
[ 25 1 
ment, even though it be of a defeasible character. 
The applicable language in section 3 is: "The 
Commission shall be deemed to be reorganized 
upon such date as three of the commissioners 
appoin ted as provided in such section ha ve 
taken office, and no such commissioner shall be 
paid salary for any period prior to such date." 
That is, the old Commission functioned until 
the new Commission organized. Then the old 
organization ceased to exist by act and operation 
of law. The new Commission did not put 
anyone out of office. They passed out me-
chanically, automatically, as the new Com-
mISSIOn "came in. " Yet, regardless of how 
these certain staff officers were removed, whether 
by act and operation of law or by the affirmative 
ac-t:ion of the new commissioners, the fact that 
they were removed was and is the sole motive 
prompting the motion to reconsider the nomi-
nations. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the Senate records do not disclose any 
resolution or affirmative action by the new com-
missioners removing any of these men. 
Paragraph 3 of rule 38 provides: 
When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, 
any Senator voting in the majority may move 
for a reconsideration on the same day on which 
the vote was taken, or on either of the next two 
days of actual executive session of the Senate; 
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but if a notification of the confirmation or re-
jection of a nomination shall have been sent to 
the President before the expiration of the time 
within which a motion to reconsider may be 
made, the motion to reconsider shall be accom-
panied by a motion to request the President to 
return such notification to the Senate. Any 
motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination 
may be laid on the table without prejudice to 
the nomination, and shall be a final disposition 
of such motion. 
It is important to observe that none of these 
men constituting the "executive staff" could 
have been legally removed unless the new Com-
mission was duly organized. If it were not, 
because the President had prematurely ap-
pointed and commissioned it, then were not all 
of its acts the merest nullities, and did not the 
old Commission obviously still continue with 
its executive staff intact? . However, by holding 
the new Commission responsible for such re-
movals, since the motion to reconsider of neces-
sity admits the due reorganization of the new 
Commission and the validity of its assumed 
acts, does not the situation therefore resolve 
itself as follows: The Senate determines it will 
reconsider and recall its consent to the appoint-
ment of these commissioners because it dis-
approves of their conduct subsequent to their 
due qualification as officials of the government. 
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That is, in a word, reconsideration by the Senate 
under rule 38 is the Constitutional synonym of 
removal as that power is exercised by the Ex-
ecutive. 
When the nominations were voted upon and 
the Vice-President at the close of each vote 
then and there forth wi th directed and ordered 
in open executive session, and in the hearing of 
the Senate that the President should be notified 
of the action so taken, namely, that the nomi-
nations had been confirmed, the Senate was in 
exactly this position: It had advised and con-
sented to the nominations and the President had 
been duly notified as expressly ordered and no 
objection was made to such notification. The 
question therefore is squarely presented: Can 
the Senate with knowledge sit silently and idly 
. by and permit the making of a statement which 
clearly involves its consent to a situation 
palpably inconsistent with its right subsequently 
to move to reconsider. By consenting and 
agreeing to the President being so notified, did 
it not waive its right to invoke the provisions 
of rule 38? That is, did not the Senate by 
such intelligent silence estop itself to move to 
reconsider the confirmation of these commis-
sioners? The argument is seriously advanced 
that the Senate could only waive its authority 
under paragraph 3 of rule 38 by an affirmative 
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vote to that effect. This argument is advanced 
in reply to the assertion that when the Vice-
President announced in effect: The Senate has 
confirmed the nominations and the President 
will be notified, that it undoubtedly agreed 
that since it had discharged its constitutional 
duty by advising and consenting to the nomi-
nations, there was no reason why the executive 
should not proceed to execute and fully per-
form his executive functions in the premises. 
It is difficult to appreciate how the Senate could 
have waived the rule, if it is subject to waiver, 
more directly, explicitly and intentionally than 
it did by sitting silently by in the hearing of 
the general statement such as the Vice-President 
made and offering no protest or objection what-
soever. 
Those who favor the motion to reconsider 
contend most strenuously: That there are two 
rules: First, the one in Paragraph 3 of rule 38, 
which relates to motions to reconsider; and 
second, the provision in Paragraph 4 of the same 
rule which provides: That the Secretary of 
the Senate shall not return a confirmed or 
rejected nomination to the President within the 
time limited for a motion to reconsider, or while 
such motion is pending, unless otherwise ordered 
by the Senate. The argument is then made, 
that a return, with the knowledge and consent 
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of the Senate, of any confirmed nomination by 
the Secretary of the Senate acting under the 
directions of the Vice-President given in open 
Executive Session is a waiver merely of the time 
limit, and not of the right to reconsider. And 
it is then of necessity contended, that the Senate 
having knowingly surrendered all jurisdiction, 
that the President is charged with constructive 
notice that it yet reserves the power to entertain 
a motion to reconsider everything it has thought, 
said and done. Such is the contention, even 
admitting that the nomination involves an 
emergency appointment. Yes, it is seriously 
insisted that the only way the Senate could 
waive its authority to move to reconsider 
would be by an affirmative or unanimous vote. 
This would mean, in the construction of this 
rule, that the Senate must have its action con-
strued by a motion or clarifying resolution. 
Obviously, this contention involves and em-
braces such an absurdity as to refute its premise 
and disprove its conclusion. It is a reductio ad 
absurdum. 
The situation admits reasonably of this analy-
sis. The President nominated the five commis-
sioners. The Senate advised and consented to 
their appointment. The Vice-President there-
upon immediately in open Executive Session, 
two-thirds of the Senate being present, ordered 
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that the President be notified of the action so 
taken, and that in effect all matters in any way 
appertaining to such nominations be returned 
to him as the Chief Executive. Thereupon, the 
President, possessing the final executive au-
thority, and being required to commission such 
appointees, waives his locus penitentiae, the 
power to withhold the commissions evidencing 
the appointments, signs and seals them and 
duly vests by delivery to such appointees the 
offices to which the Senate had confirmed them. 
And such appointees having duly qualified, how 
could they be separated from their offices except 
by being removed or impeached? Most ob-
viously they could not be ousted by a legislative 
motion which under the Constitution cannot 
divest a fixed right. Such a motion would 
involve and interfere with the faithful execution 
of the laws over which the President has supreme 
and unrestricted jurisdiction and authority under 
Section 3, Art. II of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the question again recurs, why 
should rule 38 provide in Paragraph 4 that the 
Senate can order that the President be notified 
of its advice and consent to a nomination, but 
if within two executive session days thereafter 
a motion to reconsider should be made, that 
the President must be requested in such motion 
to return the nomination papers that the Senate 
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may have jurisdiction to proceed? Did the 
Senate in adopting rule 38 purpose the doing 
legislatively an unnecessary and futile act? 
If the Senate did not intend to waive the motion 
to reconsider, when it clearly provided that it 
would lose jurisdiction of the subject matter, if 
it ordered the nominations returned to the 
President with its advice and consent, then 
why did it expressly provide for such a waiver 
in Paragraph 4 of this very important rule? 
If it had omitted the words, "unless otherwise 
ordered by the Senate" then all doubt would 
have been removed and all confusion avoided. 
These words mean, if they mean anything, that 
when the Senate views its connection with a 
nomination as functus officio and so agrees and 
orders that the President be notified, that it 
has openly and intentionally waived all further 
right and control over the subject matter. But 
it is argued that paragraphs 3 and 4 must be 
read together and tha t so considered they admi t 
of the following construction: That even after 
the Senate has expressly and directly notified 
the President that it has advised and consented 
to a nomination and surrendered jurisdiction 
thereof by ordering the return of the documents 
relating thereto, that it can then, regardless of 
such action and the rights of the executive 
demand a return of the nomination and recon-
[ 32 1 
sider and revoke its action because of something 
done by the nominee if he has qualified as a 
duly nominated, confirmed, appointed and com-
missioned official. In a word, such a step 
essentially involves the power of removal, and 
if this is the meaning, application and intent of 
the rule as so construed, its constitutionality 
becomes at once a matter of serious consider-
ation. 
The President, after receiving such direct 
and formal notice, may have duly executed the 
appointment as he clearly did do in the instant 
matter, and as he was constitutionally authorized 
so to do. If, however, the President, after he 
has commissioned the nominee, should return 
the papers containing the name of the nominee 
to the Senate, and it being once again reinvested 
with jurisdiction of the subject matter, should 
recall its advice and consent by virtue of the 
motion to reconsider, it would clearly invade 
the executive field and by a process similar to 
impeachment exercise the removal power which 
resides solely in the President of the United 
States. Such action would be contrary to the 
meaning and intent of the Constitution, and 
not within the performance of any power, ex-
press or implied, conferred by the Constitution 
on the legislative branch. That the legislature 
does not possess such a right has been recently 
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decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Myers v. U. S., 272 U. S., pp. 52-295. 
There, after clearly holding that each of the 
three departments of the government are sepa-
rate and distinct and not interdependent, the 
court, speaking through Chief Jus tice Taft, 
delivered a most exhaustive opinion involving 
the direct issue, whether the Executive without 
the approval of the Legislative could remove 
a Postmaster of the first class. The opinion 
consisted of 71 pages and discussed minuteiy 
every phase of the question. It is impregnable 
in its logic, and irresistible in its convictions. 
It defies destruction, because it is based on 
truth and reason. The Chief Justice displayed 
a profound knowledge of the principles of our 
government and recognized that the Constitu-
tion is a rigid document which can be modified 
only by such processes as it ordains. He made 
among others the following pertinent references 
and comments: 
The vesting of the executive power in the 
President was essentially a grant of the power 
to execute the laws. But the President alone 
and unaided could not execute the laws. He 
must execute them by the assistance of subordi-
nates. This view has since been repeatedly 
affirmed by this Court. As he is charged spe-
cifically to take care that they be faithfully 
executed, the reasonable implication, even in 
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the absence of express words, was that as part 
of his executive power he should select those 
who were to act for him under his direction in 
the execution of the laws. The further impli-
cation must be, in the absence of any express 
limitation respecting removals, that as his 
selection of administrative officers is essential 
to the execution of the laws by him, so must be 
his power of removing those for whom he can 
not continue to be responsible. Fisher Ames, 
I Annals of Congress, 474. It was urged that 
the natural meaning of the term "executive 
power" granted the President included the ap-
pointment and removal of executive subordi-
nates. If such appointments and removals 
were not an exercise of the executive power, 
what were they? They certainly were not the 
exercise of legislative or judicial power in gov-
ernment as usually understood. 
The history of the clause by which the Senate 
was given a check upon the President's power of 
appointment makes it clear that it was not 
prompted by any desire to limit removals. As 
already pointed out, the important purpose of 
those who brought about the restriction was to 
lodge in the Senate, where the small States had 
equal representation with the larger States, 
power to preven t the Presiden t from making too 
may appointments from the larger States. 
A veto by the Senate-a part of the legisla-
tive branch of the Government-upon removals 
is a much greater limitation upon the executive 
branch and a much more serious blending of the 
legislative with the executive than a rejection of 
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a proposed appointment. It is not to be implied. 
The rejection of a nominee of the President for 
a particular office does not greatly embarrass 
him in the conscientious discharge of his high 
duties in the selection of those who are to aid 
him, because the President usually has an ample 
field from which to select for office, according 
to his preference, competent and capable men. 
The Senate has full power to reject newly pro-
posed appoin tees whenever the President shall 
remove the incumbents. Such a check enables 
the Senate to preven t the filling of offices with 
bad or incompetent men or with those against 
whom there is tenable objection. 
The power to preven t the removal of an officer 
who has served under the Presiden t is differen t 
from the au thori ty to consen t to or rej ect his 
appointment. When a nomination is made, it 
may be presumed that the Senate is, or may 
become, as well advised as to the fitness of the 
nominee as the President, but in the nature of · 
things the defects in ability or intelligence or 
loyalty in the administration of the laws of 
one who has served as an officer under the Presi-
den t, are facts as to which the Presiden t, or 
his trusted subordinates, must be better in-
formed than the Senate, and the power to 
remove him may, therefore, be regarded as 
confined, for very sound and practical reasons, 
to the governmental authority which has ad-
ministrative control. The power of removal is 
incident to the power of appointment, and 
when the grant of the executive power is enforced 
by the express mandate to take care that the 
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laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the 
necessity for including within the executive 
power as conferred the exclusive power of re-
moval. 
The attitude of Presidents on this subject 
has been unchanged and uniform to the pres en t 
day whenever an issue has clearly been raised. 
In March, 1886, President Cleveland, in 
discussing the requests which the Senate had 
made for his reasons for removing officials, and 
the assumption that the Senate had the right 
to pass upon those removals and thus to limit 
the power of the Presiden t, said: 
"I believe the power to remove or suspend 
such officials is vested in the President alone by 
the Constitution, which in express terms pro-
vides that 'The executive power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America,' 
and that 'he shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.' 
"The Senate belongs to the legislative branch 
of the Government. When the Constitution 
by express provision super-added to its legisla-
tive duties the right to advise and consent to 
appointments to office and to sit as a court of 
impeachment, it conferred upon that body all 
the control and regulation of Executive action 
supposed to be necessary for the safety of the 
people; and this express and special grant of 
such extraordinary powers, not in any way 
related to or growing out of general Senatorial 
duties, and in itself a departure from the general 
plan of our Governmen t, should be held, under 
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a familiar maxim of construction, to exclude 
every other right of interference with Executive 
functions. " 
In a message withholding his approval of an 
act which he thought infringed upon the Execu-
tive power of removal, President Wilson said 
(on the 4th of June, 1920): 
"It has, I think, always been the accepted 
construction of the Constitution that the power 
to appoint officers of this kind carries with it as 
an inciden t the power to remove. I am con-
vinced that the Congress is without constitu-
tional power to limit the appointing power and 
its incident the power of removal, derived from 
the Constitution." 
Mr. Boudinot, of New Jersey, said upon the 
same point (in the debate in the First Congress): 
"The supreme Executive officer against his 
assistant; and the Senate are to sit as judges to 
determine whether sufficien t cause of removal 
exists. Does not this set the Senate over the 
head of the Presiden t? But suppose they shall 
decide in favor of the officer, what a situation 
is the President then in, surrounded by officers 
with whom, by his situation, he is compelled to 
act, but in whom he can have no confidence, 
reversing the privilege given him by the Con-
stitution, to prevent his having officers imposed 
upon him who do not meet his approbation?" 
Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, asked the 
question (in the same debate): 
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"Shall a man under these circumstances be 
saddled upon the President, who has been 
appointed for no other purpose but to aid the 
President in performing certain duties? Shall 
he be continu.ed, I ask again, against the will of 
the President? If he is, where is the responsi-
bility? Are you to look for it in the President, 
who has no control over the officer, no power to 
remove him if he acts unfeelingly or unfaith-
fully? 'Without you make him responsible, you 
weaken a.nd destroy the strength and beauty of 
your system." 
What then, are the elements that enter into 
our decision of this case? We have first a con-
struction of the Constitution made by a Con-
gress which was to provide by legislation for the 
organization of the Government in accord with 
the Constitution which had just then been 
adopted, and in which there were, as repre-
sentatives and senators, a considerable number 
of those who had been members of the Con-
vention that framed the Constitution and pre-
sen ted it for ra tifica tion. I t was the Congress 
that launched the Government. It was the 
Congress that rounded out the Constitution 
itself by the pt:oposing of the first ten amend-
ments which had in effect been promised to the 
people as a consideration for the ratification. 
It was the Congress in which Mr. Madison, one 
of the first in the framing of the Constitution, 
led also in the organization of the Governm'en t 
under it. It was a Congress whose consti-
tutional decisions have always been regarded, 
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as they should be regarded, as of the greatest 
weight in the interpretation of that fundamental 
instrument. This construction was followed by 
the legislative department and the executive 
department continuously for seventy-three years, 
and this although the matter, in the heat of 
political differences between the Executive and 
the Senate in President Jackson's time, was the 
subject of bitter controversy, as we have seen. 
This Court has repeatedly laid down the prin-
ciples that a contemporaneous legislative expo-
sition of the Constitution when the founders of 
our Government and framers of our Constitution 
were actively participating in public affairs, 
acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the 
construction to be given its provisions. 
The Court's decision also embodied the further 
very applicable observations, that 
* * * He must place in each member of his 
official family and his chief executive subordi-
nates implicit faith. The moment that he loses 
confidence in the intelligence, ability, judgment, 
or loyalty of anyone of them he must have the 
power to remove him without delay. To require 
him to file charges and submit them to the con-
sideration of the Senate might make impossible 
that unity and co-ordination in executive ad-
ministration essential to effective action. * * * 
Finding such officers to be negligen t and ineffi-
cien t, the Presiden t should ha ve power to 
remove them. * * * The imperative reasons re-
quiring an unrestricted power to remove the 
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most important of his subordinates * * * must, 
therefore, control the interpretation of the Con-
stitution as to all appointed by him. 
While this court has studiously avoided de-
ciding the issue un til it was presen ted in such a 
way that it could not be avoided, in the refer-
ence it has made to the history of a statutory 
construction not inconsistent with the legislative 
decision of 1789, it has indicated a trend of 
view that we should not and cannot ignore. 
When on the meri ts we find our conclusion 
strongly favoring the view which prevailed in 
the First Congress, we have no hesitation in 
holding that conclusion to be correct; and it 
therefore follows that the tenure of office act 
of 1867, insofar as it attempted to prevent the 
Presiden t from removing execu tive officers who 
had been appointed by him and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that 
subsequent legislation of the same effect was 
equally so. For the reasons given we must 
therefore hold that the provision of the law of 
1876 by which the unrestricted power of removal 
of first-class postmasters is denied to the Presi-
dent is in violation of the Constitution and 
invalid. . 
In view of this decision, appealing as it does 
to the reason and conscience of the judicial 
mind, the President has the exclusive power of 
removing any an.d all officers whom he has ap-
pointed by and with the advice and the consent 
of the Senate. He has this power, not only 
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because it is incidental to the power of appoint-
ment, but also because of his constitutional duty 
to see that the laws are faithfully executed. 
He has this power because our institutions are 
founded on justice, and justice involves and 
requ,ires the prompt, equ,al, and uniform en-
forcement of the law. To hold otherwise would 
be to deny what is implicit in our fundamental 
law and make it impossible, in case of political 
or other differences with Congress, for the 
President "to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed." If he cannot , direct the way 
or select and con,trol the instruments, how can 
he enforce the laws or be justly held responsible 
for not adhering to his covenant if he must 
meet the additional and possibly unyielding 
resistance and obstruction of an unfriendly 
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Senate. To divide responsibility is practically 
to destroy it. Our forefathers so concluded 
when they made the President solely responsible 
for the faithful execution of every edict, decree 
or order, whether it be legislative, judicial, or 
executive. 
This issue between the executive and the 
Senate is now in the courts awaiting judicial 
determination. It is destined to take its place 
as Qne of the milestol1e decisions in our consti-
tutional history. If it should be decided favor-
ably to the contention of the Senate, it would 
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materially add to its power and control over 
federal appointments. If the contention of the 
President is upheld, then there will be no change 
from the established practice except to confirm 
it and make it freer, greater and stronger. 
The temporary political atmosphere surround-
ing a question of this magnitude and importance 
should not weigh at all in its ultimate consider-
ation and determination. The fact that political 
exigencies were present and possibly influenced 
to a marked degree the posi tion which the 
Senate took, will be and must be omitted here-
after from any constitutional consideration of 
this con'troversy. That which was done, whether 
wise or unwise, whether animated by politics 
or not, has made necessary an important ex-
pression by the judicial branch of our govern-
ment. 
ThereforeJ since these commissioners were 
nominated and appointed and duly commis-
sioned ~ith the consent of the Senate and with 
the full approval of the President, their nomi-
nations cannot now be reconsidered by the 
United States Senate in order that its advice 
and its consent may be withdrawn-without 
invading and exercising the power of removal 
which is exclusively an executive function. The 
President cannot under the Constitution sur-
render this fundamental power to the legislative 
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department. He can not as President allov.~ 
the Senate to have possession again of these 
nominations regardless of what action it may 
determine to take. The Senate cannot in the per-
formance of any of its granted rights employ and 
use a power that belongs distinctively and ex-
clusively to either the executive or the judiciary. 
Every department of this government must be 
kept separate and distinct in all cases in which 
they are not interdependent, and it is the duty 
of each so to construe and interpret the Consti-
tution to the end that the departmental integ-
rity of our government shall always continue 
and be preserved, as one of the abiding virtues 
of universal liberty. 
Obviously the provisions of rule 38 which 
permi t such a motion after a nominee has been 
duly confirmed and appointed, as evidenced 
by a commission duly delivered, is in violation 
of the Constitution and invalid. In conclusion, 
to use again the language of the Supreme Court, 
it should not be forgotten: 
The Constitution is a written instrument. As 
such its meaning does not alter, and what it 
meant when adopted, it means now. Being a 
gran t of powers to a governmen t, its language 
is general, and as changes come in our social 
and political life, item braces wi thin its grasp 
all new conditions which are within the scope 
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of the powers in terms conferred. In other 
words, while the powers granted do not change, 
they apply from generation to generation to all 
things to which they are in their nature appli-
cable. 
Yes, the Constitution has not outlived its 
usefulness. Its protecting and watchful care 
was never more needed than today. It repre-
sents to us our history, our tradition, and our 
race. It rests on the will of the people. It is 
dictated by common sense and obeyed by uni-
versal consent. It is the duty of every citizen 
to withstand every assault upon it, from what-
ever source the assault may come. It is the 
rock upon which our government is build ed, let 
him beware who would seek to shatter it. 
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